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THE DEFECTIVE PRICING LAW AND
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS-A YEAR AND
A HALF LATER
WALTER F. PErT*
On December i, 1962, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) issued new defective pricing regu-
lations.' The impetus behind these regulations was Public Law 87-653, an act of
Congress passed on September xo, 1962.2
The issuance of these new regulations immediately touched off a storm of
criticism in the government contracting community, a storm which can be likened
to the intense controversy which in recent years has centered about the government's
patent and proprietary data regulations. At the time of this writing, a year and a
half later, only a few of the basic problems have been resolved-and the storm
rages on.
It is the purpose of this article to first examine the law and implementing regula-
tions; second, to discuss the manifold problems which have been generated; and third,
to suggest certain avenues of relief which may, over a period of time, make the new
regulations more palatable to government contractors.
I
BAsIC OBjEcrIVES OF THE LAW AND REGULATIONS
The basic objective of the Congress in enacting the law, and the Department
of Defense and NASA in issuing their regulations, was to give the government
*A.B. 1941, Princeton University; LL.B. 1950, University of California; member of the firm of
Allan, Miller, Groezinger, Keesling, & Martin, San Francisco, California; member of the California bar.
'The new Department of Defense (DOD) regulations were set forth in Revision No. 14 to the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR), while the NASA regulations were published in its
Circular No. 257-
2 76 Stat. 528 (1962). This statute added a new paragraph, io U.S.C. § 23o6(f) (Supp. IV, 1963),
to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. Congressional action, which led to the passing of
Public Law 87-653, was in large part stimulated by impressive reports submitted to Congress by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) and by the testimony of GAO representatives before the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services. See Comp. Gen. B-1329 4 2, submitted in two reports, one dated
May 29, 1959 and a second dated July 14, 1959; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Serv;ees
on H.R. 5532, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-66 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. These reports,
and the testimony of GAO representatives, furnished considerable evidence to the Congress of (i)
defective pricing data in negotiated procurements between the government and industry, and (2) con-
tinued failure to require submission, and certification, of pricing data in many non-competitive procure-
ments, despite provision therefor in the then current ASPR. In regard to the former, it was shown,
for example, that in the GAO's examination of 2x8 incentive contracts, amounting to over 8.8 billion
dollars, the contractors had exceeded their target estimate in only two instances, one involving an
overrun of $87,oo and the other an overrun of $54,000. "I hardly call that a record of risk taken by
the contractors," commented Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Committee onf Armed Services (Senate
Hearings 17). As to the latter, the government's failure to require submission of pricing data, the
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additional procedures and provisions for assuring itself that prices negotiated with
government contractors in non-competitive procurements would be "fair and
reasonable."3  The Congress, the Department of Defense, and NASA were not
concerned with competitive procurements, since the competitive forces of the market
place generally assure the government that the prices it is paying are reasonable.
To achieve this basic objective, "fair and reasonable prices" in non-competitive
procurement, the law and regulations require (I) more extensive use of cost and
price analyses and (2) certification by contractors, when cost or price data is sub-
mitted, that such data is complete, accurate and current. Oddly enough, the pri-
mary motivation behind the law, as evidenced by hearings before the United States
Senate, was congressional concern over the lack of complete, accurate and current
pricing data in the government's dealings with industry4 "Truth in negotiating," it
was declared, was needed. 5 Since enactment of the law, however, the interest and
concern of all parties have shifted from "truth in negotiating" to the government's
demand for more extensive use of cost and price analyses.
II
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS
The Department of Defense regulations require government contractors and
subcontractors to submit cost or pricing data, and to certify that, to the best
GAO revealed that of 364 prime contracts entered into since the defective pricing regulations were first
adopted in October of 1959, 121 of them, having a total value of 253 million dollars, had no certified
cost data as required by the regulations (Senate Hearings 66).
' ASPR 3-8o.r, 32 C.F.R. S 3.8oi-I (1963).
'Senate Hearings i6, 22, 34, 61, and 62.
'Senate Committee on Armed Services, S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
'ASPR 3-807.3, 32 C.F.R. S3.807-3 (x963). See also NASA PR 3.807-3, which are the defective
pricing regulations applicable to NASA procurements. NASA regulations aro not set forth herein, nor
discussed, since they parallel for the most part the provisions of Public Law 87-653 and, being less
arduous than the ASPR regulations, have not caused as much difficulty.
For historical reasons, it is interesting to note here that the DOD defective pricing regulations,
dated December x, 1962, were not the first regulations to be published on this subject. As early as
October x959, at the urging of the Congress and the GAO, the DOD adopted comprehensive defective
pricing regulations. These regulations were revised several times, the latest, prior to the enactment of
Public Law 87-653, being those dated January 31, 596i. The regulations of December i, 1962
(in this article referred to as the "new regulations") were far tougher and more detailed than the
regulations which preceded congressional action in the summer of 1962, and they differed in the
following respects from the earlier versions.
x. The new regulations were made applicable to more prime contracts and more subcontracts.
2. The "catalog or market price" exception for negotiated fixed-price contracts over $ioo,ooo, was
qualified to such a degree by the new regulations that it has been far more difficult, since then, for a
contractor or a subcontractor to bring himself within this exception.
3. The earlier regulations merely required the contractor, during price negotiations, to "disclose any
significant and reasonable cost or pricing data." The new regulations omitted this terminology. This
omission has raised this question: Suppose the data in the contractor's opinion is insignificant or is not
reasonably available. If such data is not furnished (because it is insignificant or not reasonably available)
does the contractor under the new regulations violate his certificate? The answer is not clear, and
the problems which flow from this uncertainty are discussed hereinafter in the text.
4. The old clause provided for an "equitable adjustment" in the event that the price data submitted
was defective. The new regulations, on the other hand, when issued, provided, and still do, that the
price shall be "reduced accordingly." This change in language has brought about considerable un-
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of their knowledge and belief, the data submitted is accurate, complete, and current,
prior to:
i. the award of any cost-reimbursement type, incentive, or price redeterminable contract,
regardless of the dollar amount;
2. the award of any firm fixed-price or fixed-price with escalation negotiated contract
expected to exceed Siooooo in amount;
3. any contract modification expected to exceed $iooooo in amount to any formally ad-
vertised or negotiated contract whether or not cost or pricing data was required in
connection with the initial pricing of the contract; and
4. the award of any negotiated contract not expected to exceed Siooooo in amount or any
contract modification not expected to exceed $iooooo in amount to any formally ad-
vertised or negotiated contract whether or not cost or pricing data was required in
connection with the initial pricing of the contract, provided the contracting officer con-
siders that the circumstances warrant such action.
unless, in the case of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above, the price negotiated is based on
adequate price competition, established catalog or market prices of commercial
items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or prices set by law or
regulation. The requirements set forth in paragraphs I, 2, and 3 above, may be
waived in exceptional cases where the Secretary of the department involved authorizes
such waiver and states in writing his reasons therefor.
Whenever certification of cost or pricing data is required, the regulations further
provide that the price reduction clause set forth in Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) 7-io4.297 be included in the contract, together with applicable
audit and subcontract clauses, found in ASPR 7-io44I and 7-IO442.
Some observations should be made here in respect to the ASPR clauses and the
certificate to be signed by contractors and subcontractors.
First, in regard to ASPR 7-104.29, the price reduction clause, it should be noted
that this is in essence a recapture provision which enables the government to recoup
excessive prices to the extent that such prices are based upon defective data. The
amount involved must be "significant." What constitutes a "significant" sum, how-
ever, has yet to be defined by a court or administrative board.10
It should be further noted that the price reduction provided for in this clause
certainty and raised the question as to whether or not the new regulations make a "one-way street"
out of price adjustments under ASPR 7-104.29, 32 C.F.R. § 7.1o4.29 (1963).
7132 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1963).
a 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-41 (1963).
032 C.F.R. § 7.104-42 (1963).
10WBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939) defines significant, in part, as "i.
Having a meaning; esp., full of import; expressive. . . . 3. Deserving to be considered important,
momentous." These definitions appear to be the most appropriate descriptions of the term as it is used
in the price reduction clause. Probably the single word "important" is closest in meaning. No reported
cases have defined this word in the context of significant sum or amount. It is regrettable that some
other word was not used by the ASPR Committee in drafting the price reduction clause, some word
such as "substantial," since this word has frequently been interpreted by the courts in connection with
sums of money and values. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Kings County Water Dist., 47 Cal. 2d 140,
302 P.2d I, 3 (1956); Lord v. Pahl, 254 Minn. 349, 95 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1959); Application of Scroggin,
103 Cal. App. 2d 281, 229 P.2d 489, 491 (95); Estate of Teed, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 247 P.2d 54,
58 (1952).
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is not an "equitable adjustment" downward. The price must be reduced to the
extent that it is determined to be inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current. This lan-
guage would seem to exclude from consideration such equities as a contractor's
reduction in profit or loss due to his own incorrect cost or pricing data. In other
words, it would appear that this clause can reasonably be interpreted as a "one-way
street."
Second, in respect to ASPR 7-10441, which sets forth appropriate audit provisions,
it should be observed that this regulation includes two types of clauses. The first,
simply referred to as "Audit," is the clause to be used in negotiated fixed-price
contracts, exceeding $iooooo. This clause restricts the contracting officer's audit
to the accuracy, completeness and currency of the cost or pricing data submitted
to the government at the time of, and for the purpose of, entering into the contract.
It does not permit an audit of performance costs. Some contracting officers have
sought performance costs (which are not actually relevant) through the use of the
examination of records clause." This clause, however, is for the use of the Comp-
troller General and not the contracting officer, and such indirect attempts to audit
performance costs in fixed-price contracts are not proper.
The other type of audit clause included in ASPR 7-10441 is designated "Audit
and Records." It is to be used in connection with cost-reimbursement type, incentive
and price redeterminable contracts. Here the right to audit performance costs is
accorded to the contracting officer and is necessary for purposes other than defective
pricing.
Third, in regard to ASPR 7-1o4.42, it will be seen that this clause deals with
provisions to be inserted in subcontracts. The use of these clauses, and the obliga-
tions of subcontractors thereunder, has run afoul of much uncertainty and confusion.
This problem is dealt with at some length below. Suffice it here to note (i) that
these subcontract clauses are only to be used when the prime contract itself contains
defective pricing clauses, and (2) that they must be inserted, when required, in order
to preserve for the prime contractor a right to recapture excessive defective prices.
Fourth, let us consider the criminal penalties referenced on the certificate. This
reference gives notice to the contractor or subcontractor that he is subject to criminal
penalties for making false representations to the government by virtue of section
iooi, i8 U.S. Code.' To prosecute under this statute, the government must show
that the contractor intentionally submitted inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current cost
or pricing data. An honest mistake, by the language of the certificate and under the
general law, is not subject to criminal prosecution. If by chance this notice were
omitted from the certificate, either by the government or by a prime contractor, the
statute in all probability would still be applicable. It should be noted, too, that this
statute is applicable to subcontractors as well as to prime contractors' 3
"I ASPR 7-104.15, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-15 (1963).
12 62 Stat. 749 (1948), r8 U.S.C. § ioo (1958).
" United States v. Steiner Plastics, 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956).
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III
Is DOD's IMPLEMENTATION BEYOND THE SCOPE AND
AuHORITY OF THE STATUTE?
The contention has been made that the Department of Defense, in implementing
Public Law 87-653, extended the regulations far beyond the scope, authority, and
intent of the statute and that, to the extent that this has been done, the regulations
are without statutory authority and are accordingly bereft of the force of law.
The regulations, of course, have made extensive additions to the statutory require-
ments. It was necessary, for example, to add audit provisions (without which the
basic intent of the statute could not have been carried out), a price reduction clause,
and subcontract provisions, and to provide in the regulations guidance for the use
of these clauses. There has been some dispute concerning the language used in the
referenced clauses but no dispute has been raised as to the authority of the Depart-
ment of Defense to include these clauses in the regulations.
One change in the statute, however, has drawn considerable fire-namely, the
provision permitting the contracting officer to request cost or pricing data in fixed-
price contracts under $iooooo, if in his opinion the request for such data is warranted.
It has been claimed that this provision is inconsistent with the $iooooo "floor" set
forth in the law and is therefore improper.
From a legal standpoint, it would be most difficult for a contractor to prevail in
this contention. First, unless such a discretion under $1ooooo is specifically pro-
hibited by the statute, the Department of Defense would pretty clearly have the right
to issue such a provision. In the recent case of G. L. Christian & Associates v.
United States,"4 a decision quite famous on other points, the Court of Claims said:
Unless the Congress has prohibited the agency from entering some phase of the con-
tractual process (or using some otherwise lawful method of contracting), a grant of wide
and general authority to contract and procure will extend to all reasonable phases and
methods.
Since there is no prohibition against requesting cost or price data for contracts under
$ioo,ooo, it can probably be concluded that the Department of Defense has not
exceeded its powers (in view of the broad rights accorded to the service departments
under the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947)." Moreover, the statute can
probably be reasonably interpreted as making pricing data mandatory over $ioo,ooo
(if all other conditions are met) and non-mandatory or discretionary under $ioo,ooo.
The government, a prime contractor, or any buyer, furthermore, has the preroga-
tive of setting the terms and conditions pursuant to which it will make its purchases.
2432o F.2d 345, 348 (Ct. Cl. x963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (963), petition lor rehearing
denied, 376 U.S. 929 (1964). To the same effect, and cited in the Christian decision, are the following
cases: Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. iro, 114 9. (954); Public Utilities Commission of
California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 540-43 (1958); Paul v. United States, 375 U.S. 245,
251-55, 261-363 (1963); United States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg. Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 198, 214-16 (949)
(opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
"' 62 Stat. 21 (1948), as amended, 1o U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1958).
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If the government, for example, were to refuse to negotiate or enter into a contract
unless it first received cost or price data, the potential contractor would find it
extremely difficult to contest this decision.16 And this is true, even though there
was in fact "adequate price competition" or qualifying "catalog or market prices,"
or even if the contracting officer had in some other respect acted contrary to the
policies set forth in ASPR or other departmental regulations. The contractor's only
recourse would be to (i) refuse to sell to the government on its basis (a powerful
weapon in non-competitive procurement, particularly if the contractor is in fact
"sole source"), or (2) appeal to higher authority within the department involved
for a reversal or qualification of the terms set by the contracting officer.
Neither of the above approaches, however, would be effective if the contracting
officer was required by Public Law 87-653 or some mandatory departmental regula-
tion to set the terms accordingly-that is, to require a cost or price breakdown under
the particular circumstances. It would only be in the area in which the contracting
officer has discretion, as in negotiated fixed-price contracts undet $Too,ooo, or in de-
termining whether or not there had in fact been "adequate price competition," that
the contractor's refusal to sell to the government, or appeal to higher authority,
might result in a change in the requirements.
IV
WHY CONTRAcTORS RESIST FURNISHING COST DATA
Since enactment of the law and publication of the regulations, there has been, as
noted above, a decided shift in the "87-653" storm center-a shift from an interest
in the "truth in negotiating" requirements, as contained in the statute and regulations,
to a deep concern over the government's extensive demand for submission of cost
data.
This shift can be attributed in large part to an increasing acceptance of the fact
that, when dealing with the government and the expenditure of public funds, govern-
ment contractors and subcontractors can no longer rely on the doctrine of caveat
emptor. In other words, when cost data is required, it is generally accepted that
such data must be accurate, complete, and current. On the other hand, the govern-
ment contract industry cannot accept, and in fact strongly resists, the government's
growing demand for submission of certified cost data. In brief, here are the reasons
why.
A. Invasion of Privacy
First, the submission of cost data in a fixed-price procurement is viewed as an
invasion of privacy. Detailed cost information, many contractors argue, is often
" Although bid and award problems may be litigated in court, Noce v. Edward E. Morgan Co.,
io6 F.ad 746 (8th Cir. 1939), a bidder ordinarily cannot compel an award to him, or prevent an award
to another bidder, or recover damages for failure to follow discretionary regulations. See United States
v. Gray Line Water Tours of Charleston, 311 F.2d 779 (4 th Cir. x962); and Heyer Products Co. v.
United States, 14o F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
558 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of a proprietary nature and is guarded by a company as assiduously as is any other
trade secret. A disclosure, it is said, might well result in an impairment of a com-
pany's competitive position or in some cases an undermining of its very existence.
Such concern is undoubtedly justified, for instance, where a subcontractor is
required to furnish cost data to its prime, particularly if its prime is a competitor.
The suggestion that this information can be given to the government, and not to the
prime, does not appear to improve the situation. Such data, once given, is difficult
to control, and, should it fall into the hands of others, inadvertently or otherwise,
there is no legal recourse against the government or any other party.
There is a tendency in government circles to minimize this ground, government
officials contending that contractors who deal with the government live in "glass
bowls" and that today full and complete disclosure is the accepted way of doing
business with the government. Where multi-million dollar contracts are involved,
there is obvious validity in this contention. Where, however, the contracts involved
are small, fixed-price, and call for furnishing proprietary products, a company's
desire to guard its cost and price information is quite understandable.
B. Administrative Burden
Second, the furnishing of cost data, it is claimed, generally increases a com-
pany's administrative burden. Contractors argue that, in some cases, it means added
administrative, accounting, and legal personnel to insure proper compliance-not
only at the prime level but also in the administration of subcontracts. In other cases,
it is said, a complete change in a company's accounting system and pricing policies
may be required.
Undoubtedly, there is an added burden. The question, however, is: Who bears
the burden, the government or industry? There can be little doubt that in most
cases the added costs will be passed on to the government. Whether or not these
additional costs "net out" in favor of the government is not our concern here.
We are solely interested in whether or not contractors are substantially prejudiced
by this additional burden.
Conceivably, contractors having a strong proprietary line of products (and
thus frequently being required to furnish cost data and assume associated admin-
istrative burdens) could find themselves at a disadvantage if required to compete
with contractors primarily engaged in competitive procurements, for the latter
would for the most part escape such administrative costs. Aside from this type of
situation, however, the added administrative burden involved in submitting the cost
data should not work a substantial hardship on most contractors.
C. Subcontract Problems
Third, contractors express great concern over the administrative difficulties and
potential liability involved in the subcontract clauses and procedures required by
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the regulations-which necessarily accompany the submission of certified cost data.U
After careful study of the problem, the legal department of one large government
contractor made the following observation:"'
The choice of the correct clauses for any particular subcontract, depending upon the type
and dollar amount of the prime contract under which it is issued and the type and dollar
amount of the subcontract itself, is extremely complicated. More than 50 prime contract-
subcontract situations involving the application of 9 principal prime contract clauses and
13 principal subcontract clauses are involved.
In addition thereto, contractors point to the tough problems encountered in trying
to convince subcontractors with proprietary products that certified cost data must be
submitted and to the subsequent task they face with the government when such
subcontractors cannot be so persuaded.
Unquestionably there exist difficulties and burdens such as these; but like other
administrative burdens, referred to above, the cost thereof can usually be passed on to
the government, and with a little experience most contractors should be able to find
some practical solution to these subcontract dilemmas.'
The real problem presented to contractors by the use of the required subcontract
procedures is the contingent liability to which the prime is thereby exposed. Under
ASPR 3 -8o7.5(b),20 for example, if cost data and a certificate "should have been
furnished" by a subcontractor, and they were not, either because the prime contractor
incorrectly believed there to be "adequate price competition" or a qualifying catalog
or market price, and if it is subsequently determined that the subcontractor's
price was defective, then the prime contractor is liable for the price reduction and
may well have no recourse against the subcontractor. Moreover, if a subcontractor
becomes bankrupt, a prime probably would be unable to enforce his price reduction
rights. And the prime, as the regulations now stand, would then be fully liable.
One further point. If a subcontractor furnishes his cost data only to the government
(which might occur because of competitive conditions), the prime might not have
available to him the necessary evidence to support a claim for price reduction.
All considered, it would seem that contractors are justified in resisting the sub-
mission of certified cost data due to the substantial contingent liabilities which are
imposed by the required subcontract clauses and procedures. To remedy this situa-
tion, and to accord prime contractors protection in this area, the regulations should
be changed.
" For a thorough analysis of the manifold problems created for primes and subcontractors subject
to "87-653," see "Prime and Subcontract Relationships," an address by Frederick Sass, Jr., Counsel,
Bureau of Naval Weapons, Department of the Navy, before the Southwestern Legal Foundation, Nov. 15,
z963.
" Paper entitled "Prime and Subcontract Requirements Regarding Cost Data, Certification of Cost Data,
Audit and Price Adjustments as Required by Public Law 87-653 and the ASPR" prepared by the Legal
Department, Hercules Powder Company, July 31, 1963.
10 ibid.
2032 C.F.R. § 3.807- 5 (b) (1963).
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D. Uncertainty in Terms
Fourth, all contractors are concerned with the uncertainty created by many of
the terms used in the regulations. How complete, accurate, and current, they ask,
must a contractor's figures be? What standards will be applied? Does the require-
ment for accuracy, completeness, and currency apply to estimates or just to historical
costs?21 In administering subcontracts, what guidelines should be applied in deter-
mining whether or not there exists "adequate price competition" and "established
catalog or market prices"? Are "honest mistakes" subject to a price reduction?
Few will disagree that there is indeed a lack of clarity in the regulations. Better
definitions, which will undoubtedly be developed by the ASPR Committee of the
Department of Defense and by decisions of administrative boards and the courts,
will dispel most of this uncertainty. Until such time, however, there seems to be
ample justification for resisting the submission of certified cost data on this ground.
• "Before turning to the next ground, let us briefly consider the uncertainty involved
in whether or not an "honest mistake" (under the statute and regulations) is subject
to a price reduction. The importance of this problem deserves additional comment.
Apparently, the Department of Defense takes the position that defective prices
brought about by an "honest mistake" must be adjusted in the same manner and
to the same extent as if the defect had been intentional.22 This position seems to be
in accord with that of the General Accounting Office2 3 and is based on the alleged
unacceptability of permitting a contractor to retain a "windfall profit." This inter-
pretation, the Department of Defense asserts, is in line with the language of the
clause and the intent of Congress.
2 4
On technical grounds, it is difficult to agree with the Department of Defense. The
price reduction clause clearly provides25 that a reduction will be made if the data
furnished was not complete, accurate, and current "as certified" in the contractor's
certificate. And the contractor's certification clearly exempts "honest mistakes."
Nor is the government's interpretation uniformly supported by congressional intent.
While there is some indication that certain members of Congress, during hearings on
Public Law 87-653, believed that "honest mistakes" should be subject to price adjust-
ment,26 there is an equally strong indication that other members believed that a
contractor should be responsible for only those defects in pricing of which he had
knowledge. For example, Congressman Edwin Hebert, the author of the bill
"
1 Departnent of the Army, Circular No. 715-2-27, Oct. x8, x963, Paragraph D. "Certification
of Cost and Pricing Data," in part provides: "The certification does not make any representations as to
the accuracy of cost projections and, hence of proposed prices of work to be done in the future,"
2 Department of Defense paper entitled "Defense Contract Pricing and Public Law 87-653," dated
Aug. 15, 1963, page 2, submitted to the Honorable Clair Engle, United States Senate, on Aug. 26, 1963.
See also, comments by the DOD on H.R. 7909, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (x964).
"
5 Senate Hearings 62.
=' Department of Defense memorandum, supra note 22, at 2.
'
5 ASPR 7-104.29, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (z963).
"' Senate Hearings ioi and 102. But in contrast thereto, see id. at 99.
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stated :27 "All this section requires is that the truth be made known at the time of
the bargaining. Who can object to telling the truth? The argument about persons
being penalized for what they do not know is plain nonsense:"
Far more important than technical reasons, however, is the basic inequity in
requiring a contractor to forego a "windfall profit" while asking him at the same
time to assume and absorb a "windfall loss." For example, if a contractor experi-
ences a substantial loss due to inaccurate pricing information (e.g., misplacement
of a decimal point), that is "his baby," his problem, according to the Department of
Defense interpretation, and the free enterprise system magnificently prevails. If,
however, a similar mistake yields him unanticipated profit, and it was an "honest
mistake," the contractor must then, under the Department of Defense view, re-
linquish his good fortune and confer the benefits upon the government. In this
case apparently, free enterprise has no application.
Not to be forgotten in the discussion of equities, is the protection afforded to the
government by way of the Renegotiation Act. 8 Here there is no "reduction accord-
ingly '29 for an extra benefit brought about by an "honest mistake." Rather there is
a balancing of the many factors involved, including "windfall losses," if any, and the
contractor is generally granted an overall reasonable profit.
At the very least, it can be concluded, the concept of "windfall profits" should be
re-examined by the Congress and the Department of Defense, particularly in light
of the effect of "windfall losses," and clarifying regulations should thereafter be issued
in accordance with the findings.0 °
E. The Problem in Obtaining "Fair and Reasonable Prices"
Fifth, and of major concern to contractors who develop a proprietary product line
with their own funds and attempt to sell it to the government or other customers,
is the contractor's ever increasing problem of negotiating a "fair and reasonable
price,"3 1 when cost data is submitted.
Under the "rules of the game," as it is presently played, there is an insufficient
profit, these contractors claim, to cover product development costs, contingencies
implicit in a "proprietary product" business, and other "unallowable" costs, if at the
same time a fair return to the contractor's stockholders is to be provided. And
this is true, it is further maintained, even under the new weighted profit guidelines.32
There can be little doubt that there has been in the past ten or fifteen years a
gradual erosion of "allowable" costs, when contracts are negotiated or administered
in accordance with the provisions of ASPR section fifteen. The usual justification
for this erosion is (i) that such costs are not properly chargeable to government
'7 Senate Hearings 57.
"65 Star. 7 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211-33 (1958).
"ASPR 7-104.29, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1963).
"H.R. 79o9, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (z964), a bill sponsored by Representative Edwin Hebert (D.
La.), seeks to make it clear that "honest mistakes" are not subject to price reduction.
"ASPR 3-801.1, 32 C.F.R. § 3.801-I (1963).
"ASPR 3-808.2, 32 C.F.R. § 3.808-2 (x963).
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work, even though "a cost of doing business," or (2) that such costs can and should
be recouped from profit. This rationalization, however, disregards "the fact of life"
that in practice anything more than a modest profit, ranging somewhere in the
neighborhood of plus or minus ten per cent on fixed-price jobs, is unacceptable, and
that such profits, particularly where "proprietary product" contractors are involved,
can be, and often are, insufficient to carry the load of "unallowable" costs.
This problem is compounded, moreover, by a rigid adherence "in the field" to the
use of ASPR Section XV cost principles in negotiating fixed-price contracts, despite
regulations and directives giving contracting officers considerable leeway to exercise
business judgment. Then, too, practice and policies often vary widely from one
department, bureau, command, activity, and so forth, to the next.
What then is needed? Generally speaking, there should be a recognition that
"fair and reasonable prices" is a double-edged sword. To insure fairness, the price
negotiated must be just to both parties. A starting point certainly would be a
review of the allowability of product development costs and contingencies fre-
quently encountered by "high risk" Research and Development (R&D) contractors.
Many government representatives contend that there is presently sufficient justification
for the allowability of such costs in the regulations-to the extent, of course, per-
mitted. However, it must be concluded that there is a lack of clarity; otherwise
interpretations as to what is allowed by ASPR would not vary so greatly. If costs
of this nature were to be realistically placed in the "cost" column, then profit stand-
ards provided by the new weighted guidelines would, if properly applied, un-
doubtedly result in a fair return to most contractors.
V
"FOUR ESCAPES" FROM =H SUBMISSION OF COST DATA
Based on the foregoing discussion, it would be hard to dispute the fact that most
contractors are justified in resisting the submission of certified cost data. As the law
and regulations presently stand, the risks involved in such submissions are con-
siderable.
If this is true, what recourse then is available to contractors who wish to avoid a
cost breakdown? Under the regulations, "four escapes" are provided:13 (1) a fixed-
price contract under $iooooo (subject, however, to the contracting officer's discretion);
(2) "adequate price competition" for the item to be procured; (3) "established cata-
log or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general
public," similar to the item to be procured; and (4) a submission of price instead of
cost data. These "escapes" are easy to state but difficult to define and apply. In
fact, for the past year and a half, the "87-653" storm has whirled most tightly around
the application of these terms.
Due to this particular controversy, industry groups and the Department of
"ASPR 3-807.3, as amended by Defense Procurement Circular No. 3, dated March 4, 1964.
Tim DxFEcv PRICING LAw
Defense ASPR Committee have given more attention to the problems involved here
than to any other area. And this attention has resulted in considerable clarification
and more realistic attitudes than were current at the time the new regulations were
first published on December 1, 1962. The abuses, and "horror" cases, brought about
by discretion being given to contracting officers in fixed-price contracts under
$ioo,ooo, have been largely rectified 4  Furthermore, the terms "adequate price
competition" and "established catalog or market prices" have been better and more
completely redefinedV5
It would serve little purpose here to relate the history of the controversies sur-
rounding these terms. The battle has been hard fought, and the decision of the
ASPR Committee now rendered. Most contractors would probably agree that there
has been a substantial improvement in the definition of these four "escapes."
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion, this much is clear: The basic problems created
by the "87-653" law and regulations persist. Some improvements have been made,
particularly in the definition and applicability of such terms as "adequate price com-
petition," "established catalog or market prices," price data and the under $ioo,ooo
exemption. To make the law and regulations acceptable to industry, however, more
improvements are needed-improvements which will provide (I) greater protection
to prime contractors for contingent liabilities now imposed upon them, or adequate
compensation therefor; (2) more complete explanations and better definitions of the
many nebulous terms and concepts contained in the regulations; and (3) more
realistic pricing for fixed price, "proprietary product" contractors.
It can also be concluded from the foregoing that all contractors and subcontractors
are not equally affected by the law and regulations. Prime contractors are principally
concerned with (i) contingent liabilities and the difficult administrative problems
created by the necessity of passing down the "87-653" provisions to subcontractors and
(2) the administrative burdens involved in providing complete, accurate, and current
cost data. These problems are substantial and real. However, the cost of these
additional burdens can for the most part be passed on to the government. The
primes' profits are not noticeably affected. Small and medium-sized contractors
and subcontractors, on the other hand-particularly those who offer a "proprietary
product" line-not only have the major prime contractors' problems, but in addition
thereto are faced with the even greater burden of unrealistic pricing by the govern-
ment when cost data is submitted. In effect, in so far as "proprietary product"
contractors are concerned, Public Law 87-653 is essentially an "anti-profit" measure.
The most significant step that can be taken by the government at this time to
increase the acceptability of "87-653" would be a forthright and complete reappraisal
of the government contract industry. For the past several years, the industry has
" Ibid.
Or Ibid.
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been under constant attack for improprieties in pricing and its members have been
pictured as "war profiteers," gathering profits by juggling accounts and figures and
by misrepresentations0 6 This image of the industry is unjustified and not factual.
Few can fault the tenacity and competency with which the General Accounting
Office (GAO) has sought out and exposed improprieties in pricing government
contracts. These improprieties, however, are not commonplace. Few have been
intentional and most have been corrected. What is now needed, and badly, is a more
balanced, realistic picture of the industry as a whole. The GAO and other responsible
agencies and representatives of the government owe an obligation to the nation and
to the Congress to present to them a greater perspective of the forces at play in
government contracts: declining profits, tremendous risks consciously assumed,
everyday "break-throughs" in difficult engineering and scientific problems, un-
believable "on schedule" deliveries of never-before-built products. These events
deserve special recognition.
Of particular importance is the profit deterioration being experienced by govern-
ment contractors. For example, the Renegotiation Board has reported the following
profit margins for renegotiable business for the years 1956 through 1963 
:1
Profits on Renegotiable
Government Fiscal Year Business
June 30, 1956 6.4%
June 30, 1957 5.7%
June 30, 1958 4.8%
June 30, 1959 4.2%
June 30, i96o 4.0%
June 30, 1961 3.6%
June 30, 1962 3.1%
June 30, 1963 3.1%
Moreover, the Eighth Annual Report of the Board, published on December 31,
1963, disclosed that 1,077 of the 3,487 contractors reviewed, or thirty-one per cent
thereof, sustained losses on government contract work. Is this a record of un-
conscionable pricing, a profit spree, or misuse of public funds? Surely, the time
has come to recognize the contributions being made daily by the government contract
industry.
Equally as important as the need for a "new look" at government contractors is
the necessity of a re-examination of the inequities being injected into government pro-
curement by "87-653." It has been noted above how manifestly unfair is the concept of
" On March 31, z964, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, under the chairman-
ship of Senator John J. McClellan, published a report on alleged excessive profits in the government
contract industry. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. REP'. No. 970, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (x964). For a'thoughtful comment on this report, see 6 Gov'r CoNauAaroit 169 (1964).
" Annual Reports to Congress are made by the Renegotiation Board pursuant to section 114 of the
Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1956. Profit compilations are computed on the basis of data appear-
ing in the first through the eighth such annual reports. The reports are submitted in December. Copies
may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C.
THE DEFECTIVE PRICING LAW 565
the government's recouping "windfall profits," attributable to honest mistakes, while
at the same time requiring contractors to assume "windfall losses." Similar to this
inequity is the "Heads I win, tails you lose" interpretation of the price adjustment
clause, where defective pricing is involved. Here, it is claimed, the government is
entitled to a downward adjustment in the price, if the defect increases the price, while
the contractor is not entitled to offset or recoup a decrease in price due to a similar
defect. Even though the language may justify such an interpretation, the important
point is that a strong and vital procurement process cannot long last nor be supported
by such obviously unjust procedures and concepts.
With a better understanding of the government contract industry and particu-
larly the overall reasonableness of its prices, and with a greater sense of fairness
toward contractors, the still needed improvements in Public Law 87-653 and the
regulations should soon follow.
